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A B S T R A C T   
Dreams are internally generated experiences that occur independently of current sensory input. Here we argue, 
based on cortical anatomy and function, that dream experiences are tightly related to the workings of a specific 
part of cortical pyramidal neurons, the apical integration zone (AIZ). The AIZ receives and processes contextual 
information from diverse sources and could constitute a major switch point for transitioning from externally to 
internally generated experiences such as dreams. We propose that during dreams the output of certain pyramidal 
neurons is mainly driven by input into the AIZ. We call this mode of functioning “apical drive”. Our hypothesis is 
based on the evidence that the cholinergic and adrenergic arousal systems, which show different dynamics 
between waking, slow wave sleep, and rapid eye movement sleep, have specific effects on the AIZ. We suggest 
that apical drive may also contribute to waking experiences, such as mental imagery. Future studies, investi-
gating the different modes of apical function and their regulation during sleep and wakefulness are likely to be 
richly rewarded.   
1. Introduction 
‘Dreaming is one of the most interesting and most wondrous phenomena of 
brain physiology’ (Ramón y Cajal, 1908: 87). 
The transition to sleep brings about a crucial shift in the way that we 
relate to our surroundings. While during wakefulness, our experiences 
are strongly influenced by our current environment, upon falling asleep 
we gradually cease to perceive external stimuli and to act upon them. 
This sensory and motor disconnection is a defining feature of sleep 
across species. Its reversible nature distinguishes it from coma, as sen-
sory stimuli readily wake up the sleeper, provided they are strong, 
sudden, or salient enough. Occasionally, an ambient sound like a ringing 
alarm clock may be incorporated into the content of a dream, but this 
appears to be the exception rather than the rule, as it is notoriously 
difficult to influence dream content experimentally using sensory 
stimuli (Dement and Wolpert, 1958). Despite this striking disconnection 
from the environment, during sleep conscious experiences are generated 
in a variety of forms, ranging from abstract thoughts to ‘immersive 
spatiotemporal hallucinations’ that characterize typical dreams (Windt, 
2015). Because of the sensory disconnection, however, these experi-
ences are largely independent of current external input and thus internally 
generated. 
Through which mechanisms are the neurons underlying dream ex-
periences activated during dreaming sleep? What drives the neurons 
that generate the content of dreams? Several hypotheses and theories 
have tried to account for the mechanisms and function of dreaming (for 
review, see Nir and Tononi, 2010). Some of them assume that dreams 
are akin to perception, in that they originate in low-level sensory areas 
and are secondarily interpreted or contextualized by higher-order brain 
areas. Allan Hobson’s activation-input-modulation model for instance, 
is paradigmatic of such bottom-up theories (Hobson et al., 2000; Hobson 
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and Pace-Schott, 2002; Hobson, 2009). In its initial version, it postulated 
that dreams are generated by signals from the brainstem (ponto-geni-
culo-occipital waves) that excite visual cortices and are then processed 
and synthetized by higher-order brain areas. In contrast, top-down 
models assume that dreams are more like imagination, starting from 
abstract thoughts, concepts, or even unconscious wishes, which are 
secondarily enriched with sensory percepts (Nir and Tononi, 2010). The 
present paper proposes, for the first time, a specific cellular mechanism 
that could account for such a top-down component of dreams. 
More specifically, we propose that a key component of the mecha-
nism lies in the fact that cortical pyramidal neurons have two functional 
compartments with distinct inputs (Larkum, 2013; Aru et al., 2020). 
Fig. 1 shows a sketch of layer 5 pyramidal (L5p) neurons whose cell 
bodies lie in layer 5, but whose dendrites span across all cortical layers. 
The basal dendrites mainly collect their inputs from layers 4–6 and feed 
relatively directly into the soma. This is the somatic integration zone, 
which is tightly coupled to the axon initial segment where the cell’s 
output arises, in the form of axonal action potentials. The main input to 
the soma conveys a stream of current sensory information about the 
external world. The other integration zone can be found where the thick 
apical trunk branches into an apical tuft of thinner dendritic branches, 
around cortical layer 1 of the cortex; this is the apical integration zone 
(AIZ) (Fig. 1), which is also the apical calcium spike initiation zone 
(Larkum et al., 1999, 2009; Larkum, 2013). The AIZ integrates input 
targeting the part of the pyramidal cell near the cortical surface, which 
has been called “the apical compartment” (Larkum, 2013; Aru et al., 
2020) or the “distal compartment” (Suzuki and Larkum, 2020). 
Convergent evidence indicates that the apical compartment collects 
information from a variety of sources that can be used to interpret the 
“meaning” and significance of the current, feedforward sensory input to 
the soma (Larkum, 2013; Phillips et al., 2015; Aru et al., 2020). This 
input to the apical compartment includes contextual information from 
surrounding areas and other sensory modalities, as well as internally 
generated and stored information, e.g. from semantic memory. Much of 
this information to the apical compartment comes from higher cortical 
areas (cortical feedback), from higher order thalamic nuclei, and from 
the limbic system (Larkum, 2013; Aru et al., 2019). AIZ integrates that 
input, so that it can be propagated to the somatic integration zone in 
certain brain states (Fig. 1). 
Here we propose a specific neurobiological mechanism for how 
cortical neurons are activated during dreams: we suggest that the drive 
does not come in feed-forward fashion as in wakefulness, but rather from 
internal sources activating the AIZ (Fig. 1). Our proposal is that the very 
same neurons that take part in encoding and representing the world 
during wakefulness are activated during dreams. However, the means of 
activation is different: during wakefulness neurons are mainly activated 
through their basal synapses, whereas during dreaming, due to the 
specific neuromodulatory milieu, the main drive comes from the AIZ 
(Fig. 1). We call this proposed mode of activation “apical drive”. 
First, we outline the neurophysiology (Section 2) and the main 
phenomenological features (Section 3) of dreaming. We then offer a 
brief overview of previous work on the properties and functions of the 
AIZ and show how it could be related to sleep and dreaming (Section 4). 
Next, we provide some simple anatomical and functional grounds sug-
gesting that activation of the cell via its AIZ is involved in dreaming 
(Section 5). As the cholinergic and adrenergic neuromodulatory systems 
play leading roles in regulating behavioural states, we review evidence 
showing that they have strong effects on apical function (Section 6). We 
discuss how “apical drive” can explain dream characteristics (Section 7) 
and how it can contribute to awake cognition, including the role of 
“apical drive” in hallucinations (Section 8). Finally, we discuss some of 
the many unresolved issues that arise and conclude that they merit 
further investigation. 
2. Neurophysiology of sleep and dreaming 
Using electrophysiological recordings, including electroencepha-
lography (EEG), electromyography (EMG), and electro-oculography 
(EOG), one can distinguish three main behavioral states: wakefulness, 
rapid eye movement (REM) sleep, and Non-REM (NREM) sleep 
(Fig. 2A). Each sleep state has a characteristic neuromodulatory profile. 
As can be seen in Table 1 and Fig. 2C, cholinergic modulation is 
conspicuously high during REM sleep, while adrenergic modulation is 
low. This neuromodulatory milieu has specific effects on the computa-
tions performed by the brain. Here we suggest a specific cellular 
mechanism resulting from high levels of acetylcholine (ACh) or other, 
similarly-acting metabotropic agonists, combined with low levels of 
noradrenaline (NA), which might underlie the enigmatic phenomenon 
of dreaming. More generally, we make the case that internally generated 
experience relies on specific neural mechanisms that are regulated by 
arousal systems. In this section we will first briefly summarize the work 
from the last few decades that has shed light on the neural processes 
associated with dreaming. 
While dreaming was initially thought to occur exclusively during 
REM sleep (Aserinsky and Kleitman, 1953), subsequent studies showed 
that dreaming and REM sleep can be experimentally dissociated by 
pharmacological manipulation (Oudiette et al., 2012) and in patients 
with brain lesions (Solms, 1997, 2000). In addition, it is now well 
established that dreaming often occurs also in NREM sleep, although less 
frequently and with qualitative differences (see Table 1). Especially in 
Fig. 1. A cellular hypothesis for dream gener-
ation. Neurons involved in the perception of 
external input when awake are driven by in-
ternal input when dreaming. This internal input 
targets the apical integration zone (AIZ) of layer 
5 (L5) pyramidal neurons (blue dotted ovals). 
External input mainly targets the somatic inte-
gration zone (red dotted ovals). When awake 
the response to external input (continuous red 
arrow) can be amplified by apical input (dashed 
blue arrow), which increases the salience of 
external inputs that are relevant in the current 
context as signaled by the apical input. During 
dreaming internal input (continuous blue 
arrow) can activate an apical dendritic mecha-
nism that enables it to drive the neuron’s 
output, consisting of action potentials in the 
axon (violet arrows), and that output is inter-
preted (by downstream circuits) as conveying 
information about the external world (external 
input) even though it does not.   
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the late phases of sleep, NREM dreams can sometimes be indistin-
guishable from REM dreams (Monroe et al., 1965; Antrobus et al., 1995). 
Different types of evidence have converged to suggest that EEG slow 
waves, one of the hallmarks of NREM sleep, or the neuromodulatory 
conditions underlying slow waves, interfere with the generation of 
conscious experiences, including dreams. At the neuronal level, slow 
waves reflect the bi-stability of cortical neurons and circuits between 
periods of depolarization and increased neuronal firing (up-state, on- 
period) and periods of hyperpolarization and neuronal silence (down- 
state, off-period) (Steriade et al., 2001), each lasting a few hundred 
milliseconds. Off-periods associated with slow waves have been shown 
to interfere with causal relations between different brain regions and to 
lead to a breakdown in cortico-cortical connectivity (Massimini et al., 
2005; Pigorini et al., 2015; Arena et al., 2020). Slow waves are not 
uniformly distributed over the cortical surface as previously assumed, 
but can occur locally, as a function of learning and prior experience 
(reviewed in Bernardi and Siclari, 2019). While initially thought to be 
restricted to NREM sleep, recent studies have shown that local slow 
waves can occur also in wakefulness, although with a smaller amplitude 
(Vyazovskiy et al., 2011; Hung et al., 2013; Bernardi et al., 2015), as 
well as in REM sleep (Funk et al., 2016; Baird et al., 2018; Bernardi et al., 
2019). A large study employing EEG recordings and serial awakenings 
has recently shown that low frequency activity (spectral power in the 
1− 4 Hz range) is negatively associated with dreaming in both NREM 
and REM sleep (Siclari et al., 2017), especially when the slow activity 
occurs in posterior brain regions grouped under the name of ‘posterior 
hot zone’, comprising the medial and lateral occipital lobe, extending to 
the precuneus and posterior cingulate gyrus (Siclari and Tononi, 2017; 
Siclari et al. 2018; for discussion see Koch et al., 2016; Boly et al., 2017; 
Storm et al., 2017; see also Odegaard et al., 2017 and Wong et al., 2019 
for critical viewpoints). Dreams are also more likely to be reported when 
sleep spindles display a faster frequency in the posterior hot zone (Siclari 
et al., 2018). Faster spindle frequency has been related to relative 
thalamic depolarization and longer slow wave up-states, which are 
typically observed in NREM sleep late in the night, when NREM dreams 
can be just as long and vivid as REM dreams. Finally, successful recall of 
the content of the dream in NREM sleep appears to be favored by 
microarousals and associated events, including the so-called type I slow 
waves /K-complexes (Siclari et al., 2018). 
Fig. 2. Basic facts about sleep stages and neural 
activity of acetylcholine neurons. A. Hypnogram 
showing the distribution of sleep stages across a 
typical night of sleep in humans. B. EEG traces 
from different sleep phases. Non-REM (NREM) 
sleep in humans is subdivided into three stages 
in which the EEG is dominated by progressively 
slower frequencies: N1, a transitional stage in 
which the fast EEG of wakefulness starts to slow; 
N2, accounting for about 50 % of sleep in adults, 
characterized by K-complexes (marked with *) 
and spindles (**); and N3, also called ‘slow wave 
sleep’ (SWS) or ‘deep sleep’, in which at least 20 
% of the page contains high-amplitude slow 
waves (***). REM sleep is characterized by rapid 
eye movements and high-frequency, low ampli-
tude (desynchronized) EEG activity. C. Figure 
from Lee et al. (2005) showing that the average 
firing rate of labelled acetylcholine (ACh) neu-
rons (n = 5) in the basal forebrain projecting to 
the neocortex were more than twice as high 
during REM sleep (here called “PS, paradoxical 
sleep”) than in quiet or active wakefulness (qW, 
aW), (transition to) slow wave sleep (tSWS and 
SWS) or transition to REM sleep / paradoxical 
sleep (tPS). Data from some of the labelled ACh 
neurons showed an even larger increase in firing 
rate (up to 11 times higher) during REM sleep 
compared to quiet wakefulness. Panel C copy-
right 2005 Society for Neuroscience.   
Table 1 
Physiological and psychological features, and neuromodulatory milieu, during 
wakefulness, NREM sleep, and REM sleep.   









EOG Eye movements No eye movements Rapid eye 
movements 


















less vivid, more 
conceptual 
compared to REM 
sleep dreams. In late 
phases of sleep, 
sometimes 
indistinguishable 





Neuromodulators    
Acetylcholine High Low Very High 
Noradrenaline High Low Low 
Serotonin High Low Low 
Histamine High Low Low 
Dopamine High (Medium/High) (Medium/High?) 
Hypocretin High Very low Low  
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Taken together, previous work has suggested that a key neural 
correlate of dreaming in both REM and NREM sleep is the reduction in 
slow wave activity in the posterior hot zone (Siclari et al., 2017). The 
same areas and neurons have also been proposed to be the key correlates 
of awake conscious experience (Koch et al., 2016). 
3. Phenomenology of dreams 
3.1. Dream experiences have a true perceptual quality and are associated 
with activation of the same brain areas as perceptual experiences when 
awake 
In the present paper we take the view that dream reports can be 
taken at face value, provided that carefully designed experimental 
protocols are used (Windt, 2015; Revonsuo, 2000; Valli and Revonsuo, 
2009; Nir and Tononi, 2010; Siclari et al., 2017, 2018; Siclari and 
Tononi, 2017). 
One of the perhaps most remarkable aspects of dream experiences is 
that they have a truly perceptual quality. Dreams are not mere wake-like 
thoughts or vague impressions, but, instead, contain vivid representa-
tions of objects, people, places, sounds and voices. These experiences 
are, strictly speaking, hallucinations - ‘perceptions of something that is 
not present’ - yet the ‘perception’ itself is real and is experienced as being 
virtually identical to waking perception. Again, this seems to support the 
idea that the very same neurons mediate waking and dreaming experi-
ences, simply their mode of activation is different. This similarity is 
supported by content analysis studies, showing that the modality of 
perceptual experiences in dreams closely mirrors waking experiences in 
terms of frequency, with almost 100 % of dreams being visual, followed 
by auditory, somatosensory, gustatory and tactile experiences (Snyder, 
1970). In line with these observations, visual areas are functionally and 
hemodynamically just as active during REM sleep (a stage in which the 
most vivid dreaming occurs), as in wakefulness (Maquet, 2000; 
Schwartz and Maquet, 2002). Importantly, EEG activation of the pos-
terior hot zone distinguishes dreaming sleep from unconsciousness in 
both REM and NREM sleep (Siclari et al., 2017, 2018), suggesting that 
these regions are part of a core network mediating dream experiences, 
irrespective of sleep stage. Activation of the posterior hot zone has also 
been shown to correlate with the perceptual as opposed to thought-like 
quality of dream ratings (Siclari et al., 2017). In addition, within the 
posterior hot zone, localized activations have been related to broad 
categories of dream content, including faces, spatial setting and 
perceived speech. These activations closely match brain areas involved 
in the perception of the same contents during wakefulness (Siclari et al., 
2017). Functional magnetic resonance imaging activity in visual areas 
has been used to successfully decode dream contents at sleep onset with 
a classifier that had previously been trained while awake subjects 
viewed movies (Horikawa et al., 2013), further corroborating the cor-
respondence of perceptual substrates between sleep and wakefulness. 
3.2. Similar to waking perceptions, dream perceptions can be associated 
with corresponding motor behaviors 
During sleep, motor output is largely suppressed. In REM sleep, this 
suppression is brought about by brainstem neurons that synapse on 
inhibitory interneurons in the anterior spinal cord (Ehrminger et al., 
2016; Valencia Garcia et al., 2017). However, there are exceptional 
conditions characterized by motor behaviors during sleep, which can 
give insight into the dream state. These conditions include parasomnias 
(sleepwalking in NREM sleep, and REM sleep behavior disorder in REM 
sleep), in which patients enact their dreams and perform goal-directed 
movements aimed at dreamed objects or people (Schenck et al., 1986 
Oudiette et al., 2012; Siclari et al. 2020), and lucid dreaming, a state in 
which the dreamer is aware of the fact that he or she is dreaming and is 
able to communicate with the examiner via a pre-established code of eye 
movements. Lucid dreamers can visually track moving targets in their 
dreams, and in doing so perform smooth pursuit eye movements that are 
strictly dependent on perception in wakefulness (LaBerge et al., 2018a). 
These observations suggest that apical drive can operate not only to 
generate perception-like experiences, but also motor reactions to these 
experiences, provided that motor output becomes possible (either 
through lucidity and resulting control of eye movements or loss of motor 
suppression). 
3.3. Dreams are associated with reduced reflective consciousness, 
bizarreness, high emotionality and amnesia 
Despite these similarities with waking perception, dreams also 
display some striking differences. With the rare exception of lucid 
dreaming, dreaming individuals almost never realize that they are lying 
in a bed sleeping, but instead find themselbes immersed in a dream plot, 
which they take for real. This false belief is even more surprising when 
one considers the numerous inconsistencies, uncertainties, and temporal 
discontinuities that characterize many dreams. Indeed, physically 
impossible or highly unlikely events can occur in dreams, yet only rarely 
and temporarily lead to puzzlement or insight into the fact that one is 
dreaming. It has been suggested that the reduced reflective conscious-
ness and impaired ability to judge may result from relative deactivation 
of frontal and parietal associative areas that distinguishes REM sleep 
from wakefulness (Schwartz and Maquet, 2002). Dreams are often 
highly emotional and frequently negatively toned, consistent with 
increased activation of limbic and paralimbic areas (Schwartz and 
Maquet, 2002). Finally, memory for the dream and within the dream is 
greatly altered. Unless immediately recorded, most dreams are rapidly 
forgotten and only a small and salient minority of dream experiences 
makes it into long-term memory (Nir and Tononi, 2010). 
Despite a good correspondence between our dreaming and waking 
lives (during dreams we often encounter familiar people and places, and 
have preoccupations that are similar to the ones of our waking lives), 
dreams are almost never the exact replay of waking life episodes 
(Schwartz, 2003). Instead, elements of waking life are transformed and 
appear in unusual combinations in dreams. Studies evaluating which 
elements of waking events appear in dreams have shown that many 
dreams can be traced back to events occurring during the day preceding 
the dream – a phenomenon referred to as day-residue effect (de 
Saint-Denys, 1867; Nielsen and Powell, 1992). Some studies have also 
provided evidence for a dream-lag effect, that is, another temporal peak 
of integration of elements from events occurring about a week before the 
dream (Nielsen and Powell, 1992; Van Rijn et al., 2015; van Rijn et al., 
2018). It remains open whether it is specific to certain types of events 
(Vallat et al., 2017; Veloce et al., 2019) and sleep stages (Blagrove et al., 
2011). 
In summary, dreams are internally generated experiences that are 
independent of current, external sensory stimuli, occurring while one is 
largely disconnected from the environment on both the sensory and the 
motor side. Dreams often have a vivid perceptual quality, similar to 
waking experiences, and are associated with activation of perceptual 
areas corresponding to specific dream contents. Motor reactions to 
dream perceptions can occur in particular conditions (lucid dreaming, 
parasomnia) and appear to be congruent with these perceptual experi-
ences. Features distinguishing dreams from waking cognition include 
reduced reflective consciousness, bizarreness, high emotionality, and 
partial memory impairments. In the current work we will outline and 
discuss to which extent these characteristics of dreaming can be 
explained by apical drive. 
4. Three modes of apical functioning 
4.1. Apical integration zone and its function 
In vitro work on individual layer 5 pyramidal (L5p) cells has revealed 
the existence of an apical zone of integration (AIZ) that mediates 
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interactions between feedforward information and internal contextual 
information from diverse sources (e.g. Larkum et al., 1999, 2004, 2009; 
Harnett et al., 2013; Larkum, 2013; Major et al., 2013) (Fig. 1). Evidence 
shows that AIZ sends signals to the somatic integration zone (Fig. 1), but 
the communication also goes in the other direction: action potentials 
back-propagate from soma to the AIZ (Larkum et al., 1999; Larkum, 
2013). These back-propagating action potentials lower the threshold for 
activating the AIZ. When the AIZ is activated at the time of this 
back-propagation, large dendritic calcium spikes are generated that 
cause burst firing of somatic action potentials. This process is called 
back-propagation-activated calcium spike firing or BAC firing (Larkum 
et al., 1999; Larkum, 2013). So far, the main focus of theoretical in-
vestigations into the relevance of AIZ in cognitive functions has been on 
one specific type of interaction between the AIZ and the soma - apical 
amplification (Phillips, 2017; Phillips et al., 2016). In the present work 
we suggest that the interactions between the soma and the AIZ have 
distinct functional modes in different behavioral states. In particular, we 
propose that in contrast to normal awake behaviour, in which apical 
amplification is the main mode of functioning, dreams are characterized 
by apical drive and dreamless sleep by apical isolation. Below, we 
describe each of these functional modes. 
4.2. Apical amplification as a cellular mechanism for contextual 
modulation 
Neurophysiological and psychophysical evidence shows contextual 
modulation to be widespread in neocortex (Lamme, 2004; Gilbert and 
Sigman, 2007; Gilbert and Li, 2013). That evidence supports a rigorous, 
mathematically specified, theory of cortical function in which contex-
tual fields are explicitly distinguished from receptive fields (Phillips 
et al., 1995; Kay et al., 1998; Kay and Phillips, 2011). This form of 
contextual modulation cannot be identified with the elementary arith-
metic operators, such as multiplication and division, but can be identi-
fied with the effects of input to the AIZ in L5p neurons (Kay and Phillips, 
2020). Basal inputs to cortical pyramidal cells in perceptual regions 
convey information that more or less directly reflects external, sensory 
information. Inputs to the AIZ arise from a diverse variety of internal 
sources including higher cortical regions, higher-order thalamus, limbic 
regions, and the amygdala (Larkum, 2013). Those inputs provide the 
context for interpreting current information about the external world 
arriving at the basal dendrites. By amplifying or attenuating trans-
mission of that external input, the apical input to the AIZ helps to 
disambiguate and interpret its meaning (reviewed in Phillips et al., 
2015; Phillips, 2017). 
Evidence from a wide variety of methodologies suggests that apical 
amplification provides a cellular mechanism for contextual modulation, 
thus involving it in a wide range of cognitive functions and their dis-
orders (Phillips et al., 2015). For example, in perception apical ampli-
fication could be the cellular basis of contextual disambiguation, where 
one and the same stimulus is perceived differently in different contexts. 
More generally, apical amplification is a potential mechanism for the 
context-dependence of our thoughts and actions (e.g. a knife could be a 
tool for buttering or cutting, a way to turn a screw, or a weapon). 
Similarly, one could think of selective attention as working through 
apical amplification: if one is looking for her child in a crowd, the 
neurons representing this child can be pre-activated via the AIZ. Other 
cognitive functions in which apical amplification is implicated include 
cognitive control, and the flexible selection and coordination of 
behavioral action (Phillips et al., 2015). 
4.3. Apical drive as a mechanism for expressing information from internal 
sources 
Given the importance of contextual modulation to many cognitive 
functions, and the evidence relating that to apical amplification, the 
amplifying response to concurrent basal depolarization has been the 
main apical function emphasized so far (e.g. Spratling and Johnson, 
2006; Phillips et al., 2015, 2016; Wibral et al., 2017; Takahashi et al., 
2016). We now argue that apical function can be related to sleep and 
dreaming if two other possible modes of apical function are also 
considered, i.e. apical drive, and apical isolation. As shown in Fig. 3, our 
working hypothesis is that apical amplification is the predominant mode 
of apical function in perceptual cortical regions when awake, that apical 
isolation is the predominant mode during slow wave sleep when 
dreaming is mostly absent or qualitatively reduced, and that apical drive 
is the predominant mode when dreaming in REM sleep. Sections 5 and 6 
of the paper will describe apical drive in more detail. Here it is sufficient 
to say that these three modes are tightly related and are all based on the 
same principles as described in 3.1. Apical drive can be seen as a very 
sensitive version of apical amplification, where the activation of AIZ can 
trigger axonal action potential output from the cell (Larkum et al., 1999; 
Suzuki and Larkum, 2020). This conclusion suggests that apical drive 
might also be observed under wakefulness, a topic that will be taken up 
in section 8. 
4.4. Apical isolation as a mechanism for suppressing the effect of apical 
input on spiking 
Though the focus of this paper is on apical drive during dreams, a 
brief outline of the concept of apical isolation is also needed. As depicted 
in Fig. 3, during apical isolation the AIZ might be activated, but this 
activation neither strongly modulates nor drives somatic spiking. In 
other words, the AIZ is largely isolated from the processes happening at 
the soma. Such isolation might be the state of affairs during some parts 
of NREM sleep. For example it has been observed that during spindle- 
rich NREM sleep, the activity of the AIZ is increased, while this in-
crease is not seen at the cell somata (Seibt et al., 2017). Another evi-
dence for apical isolation comes from the state of general anesthesia 
where even a strong activation of the AIZ has essentially no effect on 
somatic activity (Suzuki and Larkum, 2020). As anesthesia is similar to 
dreamless sleep in the sense that there is no conscious experience, it is 
reasonable to suggest that such a state might also happen during certain 
phases of NREM sleep. Suzuki and Larkum (2020) showed that the effect 
of AIZ on soma is controlled by metabotropic ACh and glutamate re-
ceptors: Blocking these receptors blocked the effect of AIZ on somatic 
spiking. A similar mechanism is likely to cause apical isolation also 
during SWS. Taken together, apical isolation is a state where there is 
active dendritic processing independently of spiking activity of these 
cells. It is worth noting that this state of activation might be crucial for 
systems memory consolidation (Seibt et al., 2017; Klinzing et al., 2019). 
5. Anatomical and functional arguments suggest that dreams 
could arise from apical drive in neocortical pyramidal cells 
5.1. Direct empirical support for apical drive 
There is direct experimental evidence showing that the activation of 
AIZ can affect perception and hence be a suitable candidate for gener-
ating dreams. In a sensory detection task, Takahashi et al. (2016) 
demonstrated that manipulation of the AIZ of L5p cells affects the 
behavioral report of the animal. In this experiment, mice learned to 
detect weak whisker stimuli of different intensities i.e. sometimes at, 
sometimes below, sometimes above the detection threshold. This 
allowed the researchers to demonstrate that the activity of AIZ was well 
correlated with the animal’s behavioral “report” of (i.e. its response to) 
its sensory perception. In addition, signals from AIZ could predict the 
behavioral hits and misses of threshold stimuli. Most importantly, 
directly influencing the AIZ through pharmacological intervention or 
optogenetics had a measurable influence on the detection behavior of 
the animal; in particular, optogenetic activation of the AIZ led to false 
alarms. In other words, artificially activating the AIZ caused the animal 
to respond as if a whisker stimulus would have been present. Hence, it 
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might have been that the animal “dreamt up” a stimulus that was not 
there, causing a vivid illusion, just like humans have been shown to do 
when expecting a stimulus that in reality is not there on the screen (Aru 
and Bachmann, 2017; Aru et al., 2018). This research offers strong 
support for the claim that input to AIZ can activate the cells and can lead 
to the animal reporting the presence of a sensory signal. Hence, AIZ 
activation could in principle lead to perceptual experiences including 
dreams. 
Recently, Suzuki and Larkum (2020) went a step further in dissecting 
the mechanisms of apical drive. The authors optogenetically stimulated 
the AIZ of L5p cells, thus in effect generating an artificial ‘apical drive’, 
and measured the effects of this perturbation on the activity at the soma 
of the same cells while varying the state of consciousness of the animal. 
In the awake state, stimulation of AIZ had a large effect on the soma and 
could drive high frequency firing of the neurons. However, various an-
esthetics made this effect disappear: the same optogenetic stimulation of 
the AIZ did not propagate to the soma under anesthesia. Hence, under 
anesthesia apical drive was not effective. This situation, where the AIZ is 
activated but this activation is not propagated to the soma, corresponds 
to “apical isolation” (Fig. 3, right), a state seen in NREM sleep (Seibt 
et al., 2017). Accordingly, the situation where strong activation of AIZ 
leads to neuronal output corresponds to apical drive. As in the experi-
ments of Suzuki and Larkum (2020) such apical drive was artificially 
elicited during wakefulness, it is in principle possible that apical drive 
could also be occurring in the awake state (see section 8). 
Suzuki and Larkum (2020) went on to study the processes underlying 
apical drive: which mechanisms are responsible for this blocking of the 
drive from AIZ to soma? One of the main results was that blocking the 
muscarinic ACh (mACh) receptors led to a breakdown of the ability of 
AIZ to drive the firing of the cells. Hence, ACh seems to play a key role 
during apical drive, which would fit with our idea that apical drive is the 
predominant mode during REM sleep when cholinergic modulation is at 
its peak. 
Taken together, recent rodent work demonstrates that 1) apical drive 
can lead the animal to report that it perceived a stimulus that was in fact 
not there (Takahashi et al., 2016), and 2) one of the key mechanisms 
supporting apical drive is cholinergic neuromodulation (Suzuki and 
Larkum, 2020). These findings motivate us to look closer at how neu-
romodulators control the workings of AIZ (Section 6). 
5.2. Anatomical arguments 
As mentioned on several occasions, the input to AIZ comes from 
various internal sources (Larkum, 2013). Feedback from higher cortical 
areas, for example from the frontal and parietal cortices, is known to 
target the AIZ and layer 6 of the same column (Markov et al., 2014; 
Harris et al., 2018). During REM the activity of limbic and paralimbic 
areas, including the amygdala, anterior cingulate cortex, and insula, is 
higher than in wakefulness (Maquet et al., 1996; Nofzinger et al., 1997). 
These areas are the prime candidates for the sources of apical drive 
during dreams, as indeed these areas send projections to AIZ (Amaral 
et al., 2003; Leinweber et al., 2017). Also the hippocampus is known to 
project to layer 1 of certain cortical areas (Yamawaki et al., 2019), and 
perirhinal cortex projects to AIZ (Doron et al., 2019). Finally, higher 
order thalamic nuclei, such as the pulvinar, and the intralaminar nuclei, 
also send their projections to AIZ (Jones, 2012; Larkum, 2013). All these 
areas are in a position to potentially drive the pyramidal neurons during 
dreaming and hence are the main suspects for the internal sources of 
dreaming. 
5.3. Arguments based on Bayesian brain theory 
It might be worth considering the possible computational role of the 
inputs to AIZ and soma. One important insight that has a long history is 
that the external world cannot be directly sensed, but rather has to be 
inferred by the brain (Kant, 1781; von Helmholtz, 1860; Russell, 1912; 
Hohwy, 2013). Accordingly, conceptions of neocortex as performing 
probabilistic inference in what is known as a ‘Bayesian’ manner have 
become highly prominent (e.g. Rao and Ballard, 1999; Knill and Pouget, 
2004; Körding, 2007; Lee and Mumford, 2003; Friston, 2012). Within 
this framework one can think of the somatic integration zone as col-
lecting “data” and the AIZ as providing the prior or the “hypothesis” 
Fig. 3. The proposed role of acetylcholine 
(ACh) and noradrenaline (NA) during wakeful-
ness, dreams and dreamless sleep. ACh regu-
lates transmission of information from the 
apical integration zone to the soma, facilitating 
apical drive. NA regulates the extent of spatio- 
temporal summation of input to the apical 
dendrites. During both quiet and active wake-
fulness, apical input amplifies the transmission 
of relevant information. During dreams, apical 
drive transforms contextual guidance into self- 
fulfilling prophecies. During dreamless sleep, 
both NA and ACh are low so neurons are in the 
“apical isolation” mode.   
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about these data (Aru et al., 2020). The computations happening within 
the L5p cells could be understood as “testing” the hypothesis on these 
data (Siegel et al., 2000; Kay et al., 2019). During dreaming, instead of 
being tested against external data, internal hypotheses become 
self-fulfilling prophecies that directly activate pyramidal cells by 
themselves (see also Hobson and Friston, 2012). 
6. The combination of high cholinergic and low adrenergic 
arousal favor dreaming 
6.1. Arousal and cognition when awake depend on the combined effects of 
cholinergic and adrenergic systems 
Several sub-cortical nuclei regulate the state of arousal and the 
excitability of neocortical pyramidal cells (Hobson, 2009; Brown et al., 
2012; Zagha and McCormick, 2014). To a first approximation, the 
bewildering intricacies of this regulation can be simplified by focusing 
on the activity of the cholinergic and adrenergic systems, although other 
neuromodulators such as serotonin, histamine, and dopamine also play 
important roles (Table 1). We will in the following focus on the effects of 
ACh and NA as their effect on the AIZ has been extensively studied (but 
see Nichols, 2016 for the effects serotonin and psychedelic drugs on the 
AIZ). 
As outlined above, both the cholinergic and adrenergic systems are 
tonically active when awake, though with important phasic fluctuations 
(e.g. Brown et al., 2012; McGinley et al., 2015; Reimer et al., 2016). 
During NREM sleep, the activity of both the cholinergic and the 
adrenergic system is low, whereas during REM sleep cholinergic arousal 
reaches its highest levels (Fig. 2C) while adrenergic activity reduces 
even further (Table 1; Lee et al., 2005; Vazquez and Baghdoyan, 2001; 
Datta, 2010; Saper et al., 2010; Takahashi et al., 2010). 
Temporary phasic fluctuations of cholinergic and adrenergic modu-
lation have a major role in regulating cognitive functions when awake. 
Cholinergic modulation is particularly crucial to attention (Sarter, 2009; 
Sarter and Kim, 2015; Hasselmo and Sarter, 2011; Schmitz and Duncan, 
2018). Adrenergic modulation is proposed to have a major role in 
regulating many cognitive functions, including contextual effects in 
perception, attention, and cognitive control (Mather et al., 2015; Phil-
lips et al., 2016) and the executive functions of the prefrontal cortex 
(PFC) (Robbins and Arnsten, 2009). Cholinergic modulation tends to 
activate limbic regions while deactivating PFC regions (Hobson et al., 
2000). 
Though some previous reviews have focused only on the cognitive 
functions of either cholinergic (e.g. Sarter et al., 2009; Schmitz and 
Duncan, 2018) or adrenergic modulation (e.g. Robbins and Arnsten, 
2009; Phillips et al., 2015, 2016), cognition when awake depends pro-
foundly on both arousal systems (McGinley et al., 2015; Reimer et al., 
2016; Shine, 2019). The combined effects of ACh and NA when awake 
may be complementary such that slow fluctuations of arousal are mainly 
due to ACh, whereas faster fluctuations are mainly due to NA (Reimer 
et al., 2016). Shine (2019) argues that the main effect of cholinergic 
modulation on cognition is to segregate activities into distinct subsets, 
whereas the main function of adrenergic modulation is to integrate 
distinct activities into coherent wholes. 
6.2. High cholinergic arousal enables apical drive 
Both in vitro and in vivo work provides evidence that both cholin-
ergic and adrenergic systems have important effects on apical function. 
Immunostaining for acetyltransferase in rats indicates that the densities 
of ACh axons and varicosities is highest in layer 1 (Mechawar et al., 
2000). As expected based on that, in vitro intracellular recordings show 
that release of ACh profoundly and selectively regulates the electrical 
excitability of AIZ in rodent L5p neurons (Williams and Fletcher, 2019). 
Release of ACh transforms apical dendritic integration in L5p neurons 
such that apical depolarization alone can powerfully drive somatic 
action potential output (See Figs. 1D and 3 G in Williams and Fletcher, 
2019). This enhancement of apical excitability was shown to be specific 
to the depolarization of the AIZ because ACh release did not alter 
response to direct depolarization of the soma (Williams and Fletcher, 
2019). These effects were shown to be mediated by the muscarinic ACh 
receptor-dependent enhancement of dendritic calcium channel activity 
in the AIZ, and to last for more than a second following only a 4 milli-
seconds release of ACh. These results agree well with that muscarinic 
ACh receptors are essential for REM sleep (Niwa et al., 2018) and 
converging evidence that ACh is important for dreaming (LaBerge et al., 
2018b; Singh and Gupta, 2019). 
Cholinergic activation of nicotinic ACh receptors also leads to inhi-
bition of the inhibitory neurogliaform (NGF) cells in the supragranular 
layers of the neocortex. NGF cells profoundly dampen electrogenesis in 
the AIZ of L5p neurons, so, in addition to enhancing the effects of apical 
depolarization on somatic action potential output, ACh also disinhibits 
input to the AIZ (Pérez-Garci et al., 2006; Palmer et al., 2012; Brombas 
et al., 2014; Letzkus et al., 2015). 
As described above, one key finding from the recent work of Suzuki 
and Larkum (2020) is that muscarinic ACh receptor antagonists abol-
ished apical drive. When muscarinic ACh receptor antagonists were 
applied in the awake cortex in vivo, the activation of AIZ did not lead to 
somatic action potentials. This research demonstrates that muscarinic 
ACh receptors causally contribute to apical drive. 
Taken together, ACh strongly facilitates apical drive. The facts that 
1) ACh is at its highest activity during REM (Lee et al., 2005; Vazquez 
and Baghdoyan, 2001), when most of the vivid dreams occur, and that 2) 
muscarinic ACh receptor agonists facilitate (Williams and Fletcher, 
2019) and antagonists block (Suzuki and Larkum, 2020) apical drive, 
are key pillars for the present proposal regarding the cellular mecha-
nisms of dreams. 
6.3. Low adrenergic arousal and spatio-temporal summation at apical 
dendrites 
The large effects of adrenergic arousal on AIZ and its ionic mecha-
nisms have been reviewed in depth previously (Phillips et al., 2016). To 
understand some of the ionic mechanisms involved, it is necessary to 
know about the hyperpolarization activated h-current (Ih) conducted by 
cation channels of the HCN-type, which are particularly dense in the 
distal apical dendrites, including the AIZ (Williams and Stuart, 2000; 
Berger et al., 2001; Lörincz et al., 2002; Kole et al., 2006; Harnett et al., 
2015). Ih selectively reduces spatio-temporal summation in the distal 
apical dendrites, while having little effect on basal dendritic integration 
(Major et al., 2013). This means that when Ih is larger, the AIZ will be 
relatively less influenced by inputs that are further from it in space and 
effects on AIZ will decay quicker over time, hence reducing the ability of 
AIZ to amplify basal input. 
Crucially, there is evidence for two opposing effects of NA on HCN 
channels and thus on Ih. While some evidence suggests that adrenergic 
arousal reduces Ih (Carr et al., 2007; Barth et al., 2008; Dembrow and 
Johnston, 2014; Wang et al., 2007), other data suggest that noradren-
aline can enhance Ih (Pedarzani and Storm, 1995; Storm et al., 2000). 
These two possibilities have quite different effects relative to the 
hypothesis presented here. If adrenergic arousal closes HCN-channels 
and reduces Ih, one would expect that during REM sleep and 
dreaming, when adrenergic arousal is low (Table 1), Ih increases. This 
would reduce the effect of apical drive on the soma by a large shunting 
effect of open dendritic HCN channels, which attenuates the effect of 
ACh and apical drive (i.e. the depolarizing, apical drive is reduced 
because ions “leak” though open HCN channels). This inference is sup-
ported by data from rat PFC pyramidal cells (Barth et al., 2008) and by 
experiments using two-photon dendritic Ca2+ imaging and in-vivo 
whole-cell and extracellular recordings in awake mice (Labarrera 
et al., 2018). 
In contrast, if noradrenaline opens HCN-channels (Pedarzani and 
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Storm, 1995; Storm et al., 2000), dendritic HCN channels would be less 
open during REM sleep and dreaming when NA is low. This would 
reduce their shunting effect and increase the spatio-temporal summation 
on AIZ, so that apical drive should more strongly affect the soma, in 
agreement with our proposed mechanism of dreaming. (See also Dis-
cussion, paragraph 9.2.1.2.) 
6.4. Overview of cholinergic and adrenergic regulation of apical function 
Our hypotheses regarding the regulation of apical function by 
arousal systems is summarized in Fig. 3. It illustrates three main con-
clusions. 1. The cholinergic and adrenergic arousal systems, which 
regulate transitions between waking and different sleep stages both have 
large effects on apical function in L5p cells. 2. Apical depolarization in 
those cells is sufficient to generate somatic action potentials given 
adequate cholinergic arousal, such as during REM sleep dreaming. 3. 
When cholinergic and adrenergic arousal are combined, as in the awake 
state, apical depolarization guides the probabilistic inferences made 
from sensory data by amplifying signals that are either probable or 
highly informative in the current context. However, even during 
wakefulness, the levels of cholinergic and adrenergic arousal are not 
constant (e.g. Brown et al., 2012; McGinley et al., 2015; Reimer et al., 
2016). This raises the possibility that subtle phasic changes in those 
arousal systems, when awake, regulate apical function so that it ap-
proaches the idealised modes of apical function sketched in Section 4 
and Fig. 3 to greater or lesser degrees. In particular, we suggest that 
apical drive can also happen during wakefulness (see Section 8). 
7. Apical drive and dreaming 
7.1. Apical drive and dream characteristics 
Our proposal, which takes into account the distinct effects of ACh 
and NA on apical function, can help explain several phenomenological 
aspects of typical REM sleep dreams (Table 2). First, we propose that in 
the presence of high ACh levels, internal input into the AIZ directly 
drives pyramidal cell output. This accounts for the fact that dreams are 
experiences that are generated internally, without influence of current 
external stimuli. 
Second, we hypothesize that the same pyramidal neurons involved in 
the perception of external stimuli during wakefulness are involved in 
dreams. However, instead of being activated by external sensory stim-
ulation through inputs to the soma, during dreams, pyramidal neurons 
are activated mainly by internal information through apical drive 
(Fig. 3). The fact that the same sensory neurons are activated during 
dreaming and perception can explain why dreams have a vivid perceptual 
quality, similar to waking perception, and is consistent with the obser-
vation that perceptual contents in dreams activate the same areas as 
corresponding contents during wakefulness (Siclari et al., 2017). 
Third, as explained in Section 6.3. low adrenergic arousal changes 
spatio-temporal summation in the apical tuft. According to one hy-
pothesis (See Section 6.3), low adrenergic arousal reduces and according 
to the other hypothesis it enhances spatio-temporal summation. In either 
case, this implies that during dreaming the inputs impinging on the AIZ 
will be relatively different from the inputs that affect AIZ when awake. 
There is not yet much empirical evidence about which types of inputs 
are spatially closer to the AIZ and which ones are more distal (Cruik-
shank et al., 2012; Yamawaki et al., 2019), but in principle it is possible 
that inputs from certain structures (e.g. limbic and paralimbic areas) 
project to locations closer or further away to AIZ than other structures 
(e.g. higher cortical areas). Such limbic projection patterns, together 
with the effect of low NA that changes the relative strength of inputs 
during REM sleep, might explain the emotional content of dreams. 
Finally, our hypothesis can also help explain why dreams may 
contain features that differ from waking perceptions. Most agree that 
dreams are flagrantly ‘psychotic’ in that they tend to include experiences 
that are hallucinatory and delusional (e.g. Hobson, 2009; Walker, 2017). 
According to our hypothesis, bizarre or incongruent elements (unlikely 
associations) can occur because in dreams, the content of the experience 
does not predominantly reflect the properties of current external stimuli, 
like in waking perception, but instead the way information is organized 
‘internally’ and transmitted to the apical compartment of pyramidal 
cells. In addition, if the low noradrenaline levels in REM sleep lead to an 
increased spatiotemporal summation of different inputs arriving at the 
apical dendrite, as suggested by some experimental work (Pedarzani and 
Storm, 1995; Storm et al., 2000), then this may help explain why REM 
sleep dreams represent such a rich ‘hyperassociative’ state, in which 
seemingly disparate or only loosely related concepts or objects become 
connected in one single dream scene. Apical drive may therefore help 
explain (probably in conjunction with other mechanisms; Solms, 1997; 
Nichols, 2016) how incongruence can come about during dreams and 
may also provide insights about the function of dreams (Fig. 4). 
A long-standing idea in neuroscience is that the brain learns an in-
ternal model of the world (Conant and Ross Ashby, 1970; Gregory, 1980; 
Friston, 2010) (Fig. 4, middle). This model is built up through learning 
and plasticity based on waking experiences and it might be adjusted 
during sleep (Hinton et al., 1995). In this internal model there are parts 
(subspaces) that are never visited during wakefulness, i.e. they are never 
directly experienced. An insight from recent advances in machine 
learning is that in order to better generalize to the environment, it is 
beneficial to explore these unvisited subspaces (in machine learning 
terms, this is known as “generative replay” (Shin et al., 2017; Hoel, 
2020; Stoianov et al., 2020; van de Ven et al., 2020). It is possible that 
Table 2 
Apical drive and dream characteristics.  
Features of REM sleep 
experiences 
Description Possible underlying 
mechanism at cellular 
level 
Internal generation of 
dream experiences 
Dreams are internally 
generated experiences, 
independent of sensory 
input. 
In the presence of high 
ACh levels, ‘internal’ input 
into the AIZ directly drives 
pyramidal output/firing. 
Perceptual quality of 
dream experiences 
Dreams are like vivid 
‘hallucinations’, with a 
perceptual quality that is 
similar to waking 
experiences. 
The same pyramidal 
neurons that mediate 
perceptions during 
wakefulness are activated 
during dreams, only the 
way they are activated 
differ. Instead of being 
activated by external 
sensory stimulation 
through inputs close to the 
soma, like during 
wakefulness, during 
dreams, they are activated 
by internal information 
transmitted to the soma 




Dreams can contain 
incongruencies (for 
example unusual 
associations or physically 
impossible events), they 
represent a 
hyperassociative state, in 
which seemingly disparate 
or only loosely related 
contents become connected 
in one single dream scene. 
In dreams, the content of 
the experience does not 
reflect the exact properties 
of external stimuli, like in 
waking perception, but 
instead the way 
information is organized 
‘internally’ and 
transmitted to apical 
dendrites. Increased 
spatiotemporal 
summation and influence 
of more distal inputs 
arriving at the apical 
dendrite (possibly 
favoured by low NA) may 
explain hyper- 
associativity.  
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dreams reflect this exploration, where a point in this internal model is 
activated and, via feedback connections to cortex, drives the AIZ of L5p 
cells (Fig. 4, purple lines). It might be that in wakefulness these L5p cells 
have never participated in a joint experience; hence, apical drive as-
sembles a dream experience that consists of incongruent elements. Thus, 
apical drive potentially sheds light on the nature and function of dreams: 
they are samples from the internal model that help to generalize to the 
external world. This idea is related to several other proposals about the 
function of dreaming (Hobson et al., 2014; Hoel, 2020) and seems 
compatible with various ideas in the field (Revonsuo, 2000; Valli and 
Revonsuo, 2009; Nir and Tononi, 2010; Windt, 2015). Other mecha-
nisms, including the relative frontal deactivation that has been docu-
mented in REM sleep compared to wakefulness (Braun et al., 1997; 
Maquet, 1997), may play a role in the reduced reflective consciousness 
and lack of insight with respect to the bizarre elements in dreams. 
8. Apical drive in the awake brain: a mechanism for internally 
generated cognition 
8.1. Apical drive when awake 
Though this paper is primarily concerned with dreaming, the possi-
bility of apical drive as a mode of apical function has implications for our 
understanding of the waking state, because perceiving and thinking 
when awake may share some neural substrates with dreaming (Per-
ogamvros et al., 2017; Siclari et al., 2017). In particular, it has been 
suggested that dreaming shares functional and neuronal similarities 
with mental imagery (Nir and Tononi, 2010). Could then mental im-
agery and some other processes during wakefulness also depend on 
apical drive? Are there conditions under which apical drive may be 
useful when awake? How are transitions between different modes of 
apical function regulated when awake? What prevents apical drive from 
occurring if inappropriate when awake? 
There are many psychological phenomena that might be due to 
activation of neurons in perceptual regions by input from internal 
sources when awake. One is amodal completion in normal perception. 
Amodal completion uses internal knowledge to fill-in sensory data that 
is missing, but under the strict control of data that is present (Pessoa 
et al., 1998; van Lier and Gerbino, 2015). Other phenomena include 
thinking in visual, verbal, and other modalities, as in visual short-term 
memory for example (Phillips, 1974, 1983; Postle, 2015). Many other 
psychological phenomena depend on information from internal sources 
rather than from current sensory input, including synaesthesia, day-
dreams, fantasies, and delusions (McKellar, 1957), so some of those may 
also involve apical drive when awake. 
During wakefulness there are circumstances where internally 
generated predictions can dominate perception. For example, it has been 
demonstrated that if humans expect certain stimuli, they perceive them 
even when there is objectively no stimulus on the screen (Aru and 
Bachmann, 2017; Aru et al., 2018). In such cases, strong predictions 
might overrule bottom-up perception. As the region of the display where 
the subjects perceive the expected stimuli was objectively empty, it is 
possible that apical drive is the main mechanism for generating the 
illusory content experienced by the participants. 
One mental process that is likely to rely on apical drive is “mental 
imagery” (Kosslyn, 1988; Farah, 1989; Pearson, 2019). Mental imagery 
is the prime example of internally generated perception during wake-
fulness. Recent work has demonstrated that during mental imagery the 
visual cortical areas are activated in a similar fashion as during 
perception, only that this activation flows backward, from higher to 
lower cortical areas (Dentico et al., 2014; Dijkstra et al., 2019). Similar 
top-down activation has been observed during associative memory 
recall (Linde-Domingo et al., 2019). The present work suggests that one 
mechanism of this top-down activation might be apical drive. 
Apical drive in perceptual regions when awake would only be 
appropriate under special circumstances, however, so how could apical 
drive be prevented when inappropriate? The far stronger adrenergic 
tone or lower cholinergic tone when awake than when dreaming may 
reduce the probability of the cell being driven by apical input alone. We 
will discuss these possibilities in section 9.2.1. 
8.2. Apical drive and hallucinations 
Dreams have often been compared with psychotic hallucinations 
because both are internally generated perceptual experiences. The study 
of hallucinations in schizophrenia has long suggested that they are in 
some ways an instantiation of what is expected (Arieti, 1974), and that 
this instantiation involves activation of perceptual regions (Hugdahl, 
2015). Hoffman (2010) suggests that psychotic verbal hallucinations 
may be due to ‘episodic states of heightened auditory expectancy’. He 
Fig. 4. Apical drive might reflect exploration in 
the internal model and generate bizarre dreams. 
In the middle a simplified internal model is 
depicted (simplified, as it only contains two di-
mensions). The gray circles represent experiences 
that are sorted along these dimensions. During 
wakefulness the three pyramidal neurons on the 
right all belong to different experiences (green 
arrows) and thus to different points of the inter-
nal model. 
The orange square is a point in the internal model 
that has never been directly experienced during 
wakefulness. However, during dreaming this data 
point is sampled, and this sampling leads, 
through feedback connections (purple), to the 
activation of the apical compartments of the L5p 
neurons. This apical drive leads to a dream 
experience that is incongruent. 
The blue square is a point in the internal model 
that is even further away from the subspace 
visited in wakefulness; exploring it during sleep 
leads to a dream of something “impossible”. On 
the left there are examples of both incongruent 
and “impossible” dreams, obtained from adults in 
a standardized experimental setting from REM 
sleep.   
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distinguishes the expectancy from its perceptual consequences in two 
very different ways. First, he notes that it is suggested by patient’s 
experiential reports. Patients in whom repetitive transcranial magnetic 
stimulation over temporo-parietal regions is used to suppress the ‘voi-
ces’ that they hear, report a feeling that there is a voice “out there’’ even 
though they cannot hear it. Second, he notes that there is selective 
activation in the left anterior insula, the right middle temporal cortex, 
and other regions concerned with emotional valence immediately prior 
to activation of the temporo-parietal areas assumed to instantiate the 
hallucination. Hoffman (2010) concludes that verbal hallucinations are 
due to ‘heightened auditory attention’ that facilitates activation in 
perceptual regions via top-down connections. The potential overlap 
between this conclusion and our hypothesis concerning dreaming is 
obvious if the ‘heightening’ is interpreted as implying the conversion of 
apical amplification into apical drive. As Hoffman notes, such studies of 
psychiatric patients do not prove that heightened auditory attention 
actually causes hallucination experiences, but they do justify deeper 
study of that possibility. 
It has been proposed that many of the cognitive impairments that 
occur in schizophrenia arise from reduced sensitivity to context (e.g. 
Uhlhaas and Silverstein, 2005; Silverstein, 2010, 2016; Silverstein and 
Keane, 2011). Computational modeling of L5p cells has now related 
such impairments to apical function and risk genes for schizophrenia by 
showing that many of these genes could affect context-sensitivity via 
their direct effects on apical function (Mäki-Marttunen et al., 2019). A 
Bayesian interpretation of the positive symptoms of schizophrenia 
(Fletcher and Frith, 2009; Sterzer et al., 2018; Corlett et al., 2019) is 
highly compatible with the hypotheses presented here, because it sug-
gests that when internal information is used to drive cells in perceptual 
regions, that ‘perceiving’ becomes believing. For example, patients with 
auditory hallucinations are more prone to have illusory auditory expe-
riences that are driven by expectations (Powers et al., 2017). During 
these auditory experiences of objectively non-existent stimuli, one can 
measure increased activity in their auditory cortex (Powers et al., 2017), 
which might be evoked by apical drive. 
9. Discussion 
9.1. Summary of the argument 
Dreams are a prime example of internally generated conscious ex-
periences. During dreaming, there is a disconnection from the envi-
ronment, but vivid experiences nevertheless occur. The key question we 
sought to answer was the following: if there is sensory disconnection, 
then how are the neurons involved in the dream experience activated? 
We propose that this happens through the internal input into the apical 
integration zone (Figs. 1 and 3), a processing mode we named “apical 
drive”. We reviewed the evidence for apical drive. In particular, it seems 
that apical drive is enabled by high levels of ACh, which is at the peak 
during REM sleep, and that the key properties of apical drive are able to 
explain some key characteristics of dreaming. 
Dreaming is experiencing while asleep. When asleep, our senses do 
not generate percepts. Rather, sensory-like experiences are generated 
from internal sources. Anatomical and physiological studies show that 
pyramidal cells in modality-specific and multimodal perceptual regions 
of neocortex receive highly specific information from the senses via their 
basal dendrites and information from diverse internal sources via their 
apical dendrites. These internal sources include higher cortical regions, 
higher-order thalamus, the limbic system, amygdala, and claustrum 
(Larkum, 2013). We suggest that during dreaming, conscious experi-
ences are mainly generated through input from internal sources via the 
apical dendrites of pyramidal cells. 
Much remains to be learned concerning apical function and its 
regulation by cholinergic, adrenergic, and other systems during awake 
consciousness, sleep and dreaming. We next turn to two main unre-
solved issues regarding our hypothesis. 
9.2. Two questions about the role of ACh in dreaming 
There seem at first glance to be at least two important unresolved 
questions and possible weak points of our core hypothesis: (1) Why does 
the ACh-dependent apical drive not cause dreaming also in the wake 
state, when the level of ACh release in the neocortex is also high? (2) 
Why does dreaming often occur also during the NREM/SWS state, when 
the level of ACh release in the neocortex is low? Here we discuss these 
issues. 
9.2.1. Why does apical drive not cause dreaming also in the wake state, 
when ACh release is high? 
According to our core hypothesis, dreaming is caused by apical drive 
promoted by high levels of ACh during REM sleep. But it is well known 
that there is high ACh release in the wake state (Table 1), so why does 
not this also cause similar dream experiences when we are awake? 
9.2.1.1. Acetylcholine (ACh) release in cortex is much higher in REM sleep 
than in wake. Although many review articles and textbooks simply state 
that ACh in the cortex is "high" in both wake and REM sleep, and "low" in 
NREM sleep, there is strong evidence that ACh release in the cortex is 
actually far higher in REM sleep than in the wake state(s), although this 
is often not explicitly mentioned. In particular, Lee et al. (2005) recor-
ded basal forebrain cholinergic neurons combined with EEG across the 
sleep–wake cycle in rats, labeling individual neurons for immunohisto-
chemical identification. Their data show that the spike frequency of 
identified ACh basal forebrain neurons that project to the neocortex was 
much higher in REM sleep than in wakefulness (Fig. 2C). 
Thus, it seems likely that the very high ACh release during REM sleep 
strongly upregulates the apical ion channels underlying the ACh- 
dependent dendritic plateau potentials described by (Williams and 
Fletcher, 2019): i.e. intrinsically generated, prolonged depolarizations, 
lasting from tens to hundreds of milliseconds in response to brief de-
polarizations. These plateaus are likely to boost synaptic input to the 
apical tuft, thus promoting apical drive. According to our hypothesis, 
this favors dreaming. In contrast, during wake, when ACh is consider-
ably lower (Fig. 2C) and, hence, the internally triggered, ACh-dependent 
apical plateau potentials are probably weaker, the apical input alone 
may be insufficient to dominate the cells’ spike output. 
Furthermore, the larger ACh release during REM sleep is also likely 
to cause stronger cholinergic disinhibition of the apical tuft and AIZ of 
pyramidal cells, by cholinergic inhibition of the inhibitory neuroglia-
form (NGF) cells targeting the tuft in Layer 1. Thus, Brombas et al. 
(2014) found that application of ACh induced a long-lasting inhibition of 
active firing of NGF cells. This would be expected to weaken the 
“blanket” of inhibition by NGF cells (Karnani et al., 2014), which tends 
to suppress apical activity. Thus, the increased ACh during REM sleep is 
likely to further promote apical drive. Disinhibition of the apical tuft 
may also be mediated by VIP interneurons suppressing the inhibitory 
activity of NGF- or somatostatin (SOM)-expressing dendrite-targeting 
interneurons (Jackson et al., 2016). 
Taken together, these arguments lead to the expectation that the 
apical dendrites of pyramidal neurons will become more excitable in 
REM than in the awake state because of ACh-promoted dendritic 
disinhibition and ACh-dependent dendritic plateau potentials. These 
may be key factors for explaining why we often dream in REM sleep, but 
not in the wake state. 
9.2.1.2. Noradrenaline (NA). In addition, or alternatively: the far 
higher level of NA in wakefulness than in REM and NREM sleep 
(Table 1), may differentially affect both synaptic input and intrinsic, 
ionic conductances in pyramidal cells. Acting via ɑ receptors (ɑAR), NA 
may suppress excitatory synapses during wake, preferentially in Layer 1, 
where NA fibers are most dense (Audet et al., 1988). This may selec-
tively weaken the excitatory apical input (Boehm, 1999: Jiménez-Rivera 
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et al., 2012; Ohshima et al., 2017), thus preventing apical input from 
alone driving the cell in the wake state. Thus, high NA suppressing apical 
input may help explain why we do not dream in the wake state. 
Nevertheless, apical input may still cause apical amplification, boosting 
feed-forward, sensory input in the wake state (Larkum, 2013; Phillips, 
2017; Takahashi et al., 2016), even if the apical input is normally not 
strong enough to drive the cell alone. 
During wake, NA may also, via ɑARs, suppress the inward HCN 
current (Ih) preferentially in L1 (Arnsten et al., 2012; Barth et al., 2008), 
where the densities of both NA terminals (Audet et al., 1988) and py-
ramidal cell HCN channels are highest (Magee, 1999; Luthi and 
McCormick, 1998; Berger et al., 2001; Lörincz et al., 2002; Kole et al., 
2006; Harnett et al., 2015). On one hand, this loss of apical Ih would 
reduce the total depolarizing current and rebound excitation in the 
distal dendrites during wake, which might thus reduce the apical drive, 
and hence reduce dreaming. If so, also postsynaptic ɑARs may help 
preventing apical drive and dreaming during wake. On the other hand, 
by reducing Ih, ɑARs may also counteract the reduced dendritic input 
resistance caused by open HCN channels, as outlined above (6.3), and 
this effect may dominate. If so, ɑARs, may thus reduce the shunting by 
HCN channels of inward currents underlying plateau potentials (Wil-
liams and Fletcher, 2019). However, if NA mainly works via βARs, both 
the depolarizing and shunting effects of Ih might be selectively 
enhanced, since βARs can boost Ih (Pedarzani and Storm, 1995; Storm 
et al., 2000; DiFrancesco and Borer, 2007) – i.e. opposite to Ih sup-
pression via ɑARs. Recent evidence indicates that the boosting of Ih via 
βARs dominates in neocortical layer 5 pyramidal cells (Hagger-Vaughan 
et al., 2017; Klaus et al., 2017; Hagger-Vaughan and Storm, unpublished 
data). Since NA and hence βAR activation is low during REM sleep, the 
resulting Ih reduction would then reduce shunting, which may promote 
apical drive and dreaming, supporting our proposed mechanism of 
dreaming, as outlined above (6.3). In contrast, during wake, when βARs 
are activated, the resulting boosting of Ih will tend to shunt the plateau 
and may prevent apical drive and dreaming during wake perception. 
Whether ɑAR- or βAR-mediated effects on the apical Ih dominate in vivo 
remains to be determined, and may possibly also differ between 
neocortical areas, layers, cell subtypes, and/or degrees of arousal or 
attention. The effects of NA on pyramidal cell computations will also 
depend on other factors, but it seems more likely that the fundamental 
role of NA is fairly uniform across areas, layers, cell types, and wake 
states. 
Thus, the combination of high ACh and NA during wakefulness may 
put the pyramidal cells into a state that allows external sensory infor-
mation to dominate our awake experiences, whereas the apical drive is 
allowed to dominate during REM or NREM dreams when NA alone 
(REM) or both ACh and NA (NREM) levels are low (Table 1; Fig. 3). In 
addition, there is evidence that several other somato-dendritic K+
channels (GIRK, SK, 2 P, Kv etc.) are altered by neuromodulators that 
change substantially between wake and sleep states (Nicoll, 1988; 
Pedarzani and Storm, 1993; Storm et al., 2000; Vogalis et al., 2003; Hu 
et al., 2007; Hu et al., 2009; Hoffman et al., 1997; Cai et al., 2004). Thus, 
it is ultimately a quantitative question exactly which mechanisms will 
dominate in each state, area, layer, and cell type. Although it is beyond 
the scope of this paper to exhaustively discuss the roles of various 
channels and receptors, this discussion illustrates that there are at least 
some potential mechanisms that may explain why the ACh-dependent 
apical drive allows dreaming during REM sleep but does not cause 
dreaming also in the wake state. 
9.2.1.3. Dopamine (DA). Dopamine (DA) has been implicated in sleep 
regulation, dreaming, and dream recall by several authors (e.g. Gottes-
mann, 2002; De Gennaro et al., 2016; Solms, 1997, 2000). DA release is 
known to be high in wakefulness, in particular in prefrontal cortex 
(Table 1; Miller et al., 1983; Trulson and Preussler, 1984; Maloney et al., 
2002), and some studies suggest that DA release is higher in REM than in 
NREM sleep (Léna et al., 2005), but others reported little difference 
between wake and sleep states (Miller et al., 1983; Trulson and Pre-
ussler, 1984). DA may be important for forebrain mechanisms under-
lying dreaming and hallucinations (Solms, 1997, 2000). At the cellular 
level, DA can differentially affect both intrinsic conductances and syn-
aptic transmission. For example, DA acting via D1 receptors and cyclic 
AMP may (like NA via βARs;) enhance Ih and its depolarizing and 
shunting effects (Pedarzani and Storm, 1993; Storm et al., 2000). If DA 
release is higher in REM, the resulting Ih increase may then enhance 
depolarization, which may then promote apical drive and dreaming, or 
enhance shunting, which may reduce apical drive. The overall effects of 
DA will also depend on other factors. Thus, it is difficult at this point to 
predict whether DA contributes to apical drive during REM sleep, 
because there is diverging evidence regarding the DA levels in different 
parts of the cortex (Table 1), and DA may trigger mechanisms that may 
promote or weaken apical drive. However, the roles of DA may be 
complex; a main role may be to contribute to forebrain mechanisms 
underlying the specific input to L1, which according to our hypothesis 
provides the main content of dreams (Solms, 1997, 2000). This is 
distinct from the apical drive dendritic mechanisms, which determine 
whether the L1 input reaches the soma of L5p cells and becomes 
expressed in their spike output, hence contributing to dream 
experiences. 
9.2.2. How does dreaming occur during NREM? 
Why does dreaming often occur also during NREM/SWS, when the 
overall level of ACh release in the neocortex is low (Table 1) according to 
the available evidence (Lee et al., 2005; Vazquez and Baghdoyan, 
2001)? There are several possible causes; here we discuss a few of them. 
9.2.2.1. Spatial/regional differences in neuromodulation. Several lines of 
evidence indicate that there can be important local differences in 
neuromodulation among various cortical areas and subareas, within 
each global brain state such as wake, NREM/SWS or REM sleep. Thus, 
there may potentially be higher local levels of ACh and NA (and other 
neuromodulators) in certain parts of the cortex (Munoz and Rudy, 
2014; Ballinger et al., 2016), even when the overall cortical levels are 
low in NREM/SWS (Table 1). This may enable dreaming also during 
NREM sleep, by promoting apical drive in parts of the cortex, such as 
the posterior hot zone (Siclari and Tononi, 2017; Siclari et al., 2018). 
Such a scenario is indirectly supported by Ballinger et al. (2016). In 
addition, there is accumulating evidence for local sleep in parts of the 
neocortex during behavioural wakefulness (Murphy et al., 2011; 
Vyazovskiy et al., 2011; Vyazovskiy and Harris, 2013). Thus (as dis-
cussed in section 2), slow waves, which are known to depend on altered 
neuromodulation such as reduced ACh and NA levels (Table 1), can 
occur locally during global wakefulness and REM sleep, although 
usually with smaller amplitude (Vyazovskiy et al., 2011; Hung et al., 
2013; Bernardi et al., 2015; Funk et al., 2016; Bernardi et al., 2019). 
Conversely, during NREM/SWS, there is evidence for local cortical 
activation, although the overall cortical ACh release is low. Thus, in 
deep NREM sleep, local EEG desynchronization can be seen simulta-
neously with SWA in different cortical areas, supporting that locally 
differentiated neuromodulation can occur (Krueger and Tononi, 2011; 
Nir et al., 2011; Nobili et al., 2011; Siclari and Tononi, 2017). 
Furthermore, Siclari et al. (2017) found that both REM and NREM 
dreaming were associated with locally weaker slow-wave activity in 
the posterior hot zone. In addition, compared to reports of no experi-
ence, dream reports were preceded by fewer, smaller, and shallower 
slow waves in central and posterior cortical areas, whereas frontal 
regions showed local, high-frequency "microarousals", suggesting 
local, intermittent activation of arousal systems during NREM sleep 
(Siclari et al., 2018). This further supports the idea that there can be 
substantial local differences in neuromodulation between cortical 
areas and subareas within each global brain state. 
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9.2.2.2. Temporal differences in neuromodulation. During NREM sleep, 
EEG activity has been shown to undergo ultraslow fluctuations in both 
rodents and humans (Lecci et al., 2017; Parrino et al., 2012; Vanhatalo 
et al., 2004). This occurs in parallel with fluctuations in pupil diameter, 
heartbeat, and arousability from sleep, suggesting that they involve 
different neuromodulator systems (Yuzgec et al., 2018). It is therefore 
conceivable that in addition to the temporal windows provided by 
specific NREM sleep events, slower fluctuations of arousal systems may 
also contribute to modulating apical drive and isolation. 
9.2.2.3. Other neuromodulator receptors promoting apical drive. Perhaps 
not only ACh acting mainly via muscarinic receptors, but also other 
neuromodulators, acting via other metabotropic receptor types, e.g. 
metabotropic glutamate receptors, can promote apical drive. Such re-
ceptors, if activated during NREM sleep, may turn on some of the same 
intracellular signalling pathways and ion channels (Nicoll, 1988; Rad-
nikow and Feldmeyer, 2018) that are triggered metabotropically by ACh 
in REM sleep. There is evidence for this claim, as not only antagonists of 
metabotropic ACh receptors but also antagonists of metabotropic 
glutamate receptors are associated with the breakdown of apical drive 
(Suzuki and Larkum, 2020). Hence, other neuromodulators, acting via 
other metabotropic receptor types, might lead to apical drive also in 
NREM sleep, thus enabling dreaming, perhaps via synergistic effects 
(Hagger-Vaughan and Storm, 2019). This may also be an alternative 
mechanism for the local reductions of slow waves observed by Siclari 
et al. (2017), in addition to possible local changes in release of ACh and 
NA, as discussed above. In conclusion, it seems likely that the combined 
effects of different inputs that promote NREM apical drive, and local 
differences in neuromodulation, can at least help explain and possibly 
fully resolve the second main problem for our hypothesis: how apical 
drive and dreaming can occur even in NREM sleep, when the overall 
ACh level is low. 
9.2.3. ACh and dreaming: summary 
From the above it seems that increased realease of ACh in the cortex 
is not a sufficient factor for dreaming to happen. The main effect of ACh 
is likely to enable signal propagation from the apical compartment to the 
soma, so that apical activation can lead to spiking output (Suzuki and 
Larkum, 2020). However, increased ACh by itself will probably not 
generate spiking, it is only an enabling factor. To make the neurons fire, 
there needs to be glutamatergic excitation of the AIZ from elsewhere. 
Where does this excitation come from? How are dreams generated? 
9.3. How experience is generated during dreaming and waking 
consciousness 
9.3.1. Network mechanisms of dreaming 
In this work we have proposed a cellular correlate of dreaming. 
During wakeful consciousness the activation of L5p neurons depends on 
both input from the environment and the AIZ (Larkum, 2013; Phillips, 
2017; Aru et al., 2019, 2020). We have suggested that during dreaming 
their activation mainly comes from internal sources activating the AIZ. 
So apical drive is not a fundamentally different processing mode, it is 
rather akin to an extremely sensitive form of apical amplification that 
can make the neurons spike even when there is little or even no basal 
input (Larkum et al., 1999; Suzuki and Larkum, 2020). 
According to our hypothesis, during dreaming, there is a shift in the 
way neurons are activated (Figs. 1 and 3). At lower levels of the sensory 
hierarchy, the input to the somatic compartment will be weaker, because 
of sensory disconnection (Funk et al., 2016). At the same time, the in-
ternal input to AIZ will be relatively stronger. It is not clear which areas 
exactly lead to the activation of the AIZ during dreaming, but as noted in 
section 5.2, there are many areas that are in the position to do so. 
However, of course the complex experience of dreaming is not 
generated by single cells but rather by extended networks of neurons. 
When considering the network perspective, it is important to notice that 
the downstream neurons do not ‘know’ that the L5p cells in sensory 
areas were activated through apical drive. In other words, these down-
stream neurons may process this input as if it would come during 
wakefulness, i.e. representing sensory input. So the process of gener-
ating conscious experiences in dreams and awake conscious brains 
might be similar. 
There are of course many theories, models and ideas that try to 
address the neural basis of conscious experience (e.g. Tononi et al., 
2016; Mashour et al., 2020). In parallel with the ideas presented here, a 
theory of consciousness has been proposed that is directly related to the 
current ideas. The Dendritic Integration Theory (DIT, Aru et al., 2020) 
suggests that consciousness is associated with the integration of infor-
mation streams impinging on the apical and basal compartments of L5p 
neurons. This integration happens along the apical dendrite and is 
controlled by the higher order thalamus (Suzuki and Larkum, 2020; Aru 
et al., 2020). Such dendritic integration couples thalamo-cortical and 
cortico-cortical loops and leads to complex sustained brain dynamics 
associated with conscious processing (Aru et al., 2020). Although there 
are remaining issues to be solved, it seems that our current idea of dream 
generation may fit with the general concept of DIT, as it simply says that 
during particular neuromodulatory states the AIZ can drive this process. 
Thus, our hypothesis may explain why dreams seem so real: dreams use 
the same machinery for generating experiences, but in contrast to wake 
consciousness, dreams originate from within. 
9.4. Apical drive: experimental predictions and questions 
Perhaps it seems premature to propose cellular mechanisms of 
dreaming. However, the advantage of suggesting specific neurobiolog-
ical mechanisms is that these ideas can readily be tested by the tools 
available for modern neuroscience. 
If the AIZ of L5p cells is excited optogenetically, the cell bodies are 
activated during wakefulness, but not during anesthesia (Suzuki and 
Larkum, 2020). Our hypothesis predicts that the cell bodies will be 
activated by such optogenetic stimulation during REM sleep. It is both 
crucial and feasible to test that prediction in the near future. Further-
more, Suzuki and Larkum (2020) found that it was not possible to 
activate the somata of L2/3 pyramidal cells by depolarizing their AIZ. 
Hence, a strong prediction of our hypothesis is that apical drive is spe-
cific to L5p neurons. This prediction is consistent with the finding that 
the activity of L2/3 pyramidal cells is decreased during REM sleep 
(Niethard et al., 2016). 
Another key question is where does the drive come from? Research 
has already shown that various areas target layer 1 (Section 5.2), but the 
question is, which areas provide the key input during dreaming. In the 
mouse model it will be virtually impossible to study this during 
dreaming, but one can ask, which areas provide the apical drive during 
REM sleep. We suspect that limbic areas, including the perirhinal cortex, 
play a key role in apical drive. Also, as NA regulates spatiotemporal 
summation around AIZ, it will be quite central to study which areas 
project closer to and which project further away from the AIZ of L5p 
neurons. 
In addition, one needs to better understand how apical drive is 
controlled. We have here discussed the roles of ACh and NA in affecting 
apical drive, but there could be other ways how it can be regulated. One 
particularly important class of regulatory mechanisms could come from 
the inhibitory neurons. Interestingly, different compartments of pyra-
midal cells are controlled by distinct interneuron classes (Larkum et al., 
1999; Larkum, 2013). PV+ neurons act on the soma of pyramidal neu-
rons, while SOM+ neurons inhibit the apical compartment. Yet another 
type of interneurons, the VIP+ neurons, inhibit the SOM+ neurons, thus 
their activity disinhibits the apical compartment (Kepecs and Fishell, 
2014), and the NGF cells provide another source of inhibition to the AIZ. 
Together these inhibitory neurons can gate the activity of the L5p neu-
rons so that they either block or facilitate apical drive. Unfortunately, 
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very little is known about the activation and interplay of these different 
interneuron types during different sleep stages. Two recent studies using 
two photon imaging to assess calcium activity have looked at the activity 
of SOM+ and PV+ interneurons during different sleep phases (Niethard 
et al., 2016, 2018), but more work needs to be done, especially as it is 
the VIP+ and NGF cells that are the targets of long-range input (Kepecs 
and Fishell, 2014; Abs et al., 2018) that we suspect is the main driving 
force of apical drive. 
10. Conclusions 
We have presented anatomical and functional arguments suggesting 
that the activation of neocortical pyramidal cells by depolarization of 
their AIZ provides a cellular mechanism for dreams. These claims are 
strongly supported by evidence that cholinergic and adrenergic systems 
directly affect the AIZ and that this influence depends on the behavioral 
state. In particular, we have proposed that high cholinergic combined 
with low adrenergic modulation leads to a cellular state where internal 
inputs to the AIZ are capable of driving the firing activity of the cell. 
More generally, we have made the case that internally generated ex-
periences could rely on specific neural mechanisms that are regulated by 
arousal systems. We conclude that a wide diversity of investigations, 
using various methodologies, of the different modes of apical function 
and their regulation when asleep and awake are likely to be richly 
rewarded. 
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